SECURITY TECHNOLOGY BASED BEHAVIORS
The Human Factor in the prevention of accidents
is recognized, for a long time, that worker's unsafe acts are part and parcel of the process that precedes an accident. Of course, this is not to say that these are the only causes or accident that responsibility should fall on the worker, even when an unsafe act is the main cause of it or is in the causal chain. However, it is undeniable that they are present.
The chain of circumstances leading to the accident will always have a certain uniqueness, however, surely enclose one or more unsafe acts that probably is not the first time they occur. This idea is widely recognized, because many are saying the following: unsafe actions that are part of the causes of accidents, probably running on the organization routinely by workers, and probably also explicit knowledge or tacit approval of their supervisors and middle managers.
The reasons are many and we'll start from the known priority of production before safety. Equally relevant is the fact, learned by all and especially workers to behave unsafely in part of its shares does not necessarily mean an accident. Of course there is damage to more or less frequently, depending on the danger that each work, but the truth is that accidents happen in a proportion far below the performance of unsafe acts.
seems logical, therefore, think that decreasing the number of these unsafe behaviors also decrease the number of accidents. Therefore, much of the work safety management has been moving in this direction. |
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Reducing behavior unsafe
The major objective of reducing unsafe acts has had many different patterns of action by management. These actions have been incorporated, slowly, in the history of safety management. For example, the road was built repressive call, which is punishable by a worker who is discovered by unsafe acts. It argues against this approach, the fact that often the workers perform their tasks independently, without having all this time the supervisor, or, sometimes, also that they enable supervisors explicitly or implicitly unsafe behavior because they reported a positive impact good - producing more, finish quicker, prevent pressure from superiors, etc ...-, that become, in turn, with beneficial consequences for workers.
In short, there are many opportunities to violate the safe behavior and there are so many to simulate a certain behavior is present while the person who has the ability to punish. In theory, the only way in which repressive means consistently works is when the magnitude of the negative consequence is so great that the individual must avoid at all costs. But it is not easy to keep a very large negative consequences in work contexts, this approach is increasingly less adept in the world of security management.
Another way in order to reduce the accident rate is entertainment, understood as the theoretical and skill building to develop these safe behaviors. However, we note that while this is a necessary, essential in reducing unsafe behavior, not a sufficient condition.
Moreover, all workers know that, knowing what they should do so that the behavior was safe and having shown that they had the skills to do, behave in an unsafe manner, and occasionally affected by injuries resulting from an accident. Again, the beneficial consequences for them to perform unsafe acts rarely exceeded the negative consequences of infrequent occurrence, which is injured. And this happens again and again.
There is another way, which are the rules and safety procedures. These are very necessary, but often are suspiciously drafted and signed by the worker, justifying that he knows, with the primary objective to demonstrate responsibility in case something happens. Can relate to several issues with the rules:
- In writing: when they say everything that can not be done in time to explain clearly what be done.
- update: it is easier to write than to keep them updated.
- De complexity: work following the procedures often means working with more difficulties.
- Access: sometimes to do work must take into account a number of rules, some of which are not worker access, so choose to do your job the way it always has.
The way of motivation: many safety management activities are aimed at achieving a change in employee attitudes toward safety. There are many specific forms, from safety campaigns, contests, educational lectures, celebrations, small and large incentives, etc. They are all very valid conceptually, perotampoco are sufficient in reducing accidents at work continuously, tending to zero.
One of the main problems of the latter route is the lack of control you get impact on people. Indeed, it is very difficult to measure reliably the attitude of someone, even a group of workers. You can make a qualitative view of the state's attitude towards the safety of a person or group, but it is hardly operating income.
In conclusion we can say that none of these pathways does consistently reduce occupational accidents and incidents; can reduce their level, especially the last track, to motivate (if performed continuously), but none has proved capable of reducing accidents constantly.
So the current solution is to incorporate a new tool, although you do get to measure that behavior.
Process Safety Management Based on Behaviors
The essential idea is to measure the behaviors and provide feedback and positive reinforcement to incorporate and influence positive impact in changing these behaviors.
Once you define a behavior, it can be observado, se puede registrar la observación y calcular el número de veces que se realiza de la forma esperada. Este porcentaje de comportamientos seguros puede ser obtenido con la frecuencia que se desee. Por ejemplo, se puede observar y calcular el porcentaje de veces que un trabajador realiza de forma segura el comportamiento "mantener la manos alejadas de la sierra a una distancia mínima de 50 cm. mientras la misma esté en movimiento".
Esta medición del comportamiento puede ser realizada, por ejemplo, después de un entrenamiento donde el trabajador aprenda cómo realizar esta labor, se pudiera observar y registrar (medir) unas 3 veces al día y, si el resultado de ayer fuese de un 50%, while today was 70%, can be estimated on a quantitative basis that there was an improvement.
The technology is based on behavior, unlike attitudes, are observable, so you can record, quantify, and can generate an indicator, which, incidentally, is prospective, with which you can do security management, before the injury. It can also be used for a particular behavior, in order, for example, to complete a given workout as discussed above, but the tool can also be used, and it is usual to manage a set of behaviors in a place particular job.
These processes are conducted according to the phases, then we expose:
- The preliminary analysis of the organization to identify the conditions to design an appropriate process to it.
- A study of risk and accident history and the rules and procedures to define what behaviors would be critical to safety.
- overall design process, including procedures com responsibilities, functions, indicators, etc.
- The training of a group of observers who perform the functions assigned design.
- The determination of the baseline, or leave the status of that whole process.
- An intervention aimed at introducing the process to workers who participate in it.
- Sampling of critical behaviors identified with the frequency determined in the design, followed by feedback and positive reinforcement as determined previously to be conducted.
- Analysis of the results of the measurements and design an action plan to delve into the motivating conditions and consequences that are not consistently able to improve some behaviors.
- are continuing on a cyclical stages how to enter the continuous improvement.
is vital to have two very present: the first is to use the data generated on the behaviors to take any action affecting the workers very quickly undermine the confidence that they have in the tool and the lead to a point where it very difficult to implement.
The second aspect is that these processes should be integrated into the System Security Management within the organization, but can not replace. What has been achieved so far by the existing system can not be lost, which is why these processes should enhance what already exists and no If relegate the importance of preventive actions that were underway.
There is considerable empirical evidence of the effectiveness of process safety management based on behavior, even reports that typically are achieved reductions in the number of accidents ranging from 25% - 100%.
To delve into this important topic can be found a wealth of literature, for example, Austin et al., 1996, Geller, 2002, Krause et al., 1997; Laitienen and Ruohomaki, 1996, Montero, 1995, Montero, 2003; Ray and Bishop, 1997.
References 1. Geller, ES (2002) The Participation Factor. How to increase Involvement in Occupational Safety, American Society of Safety Engineers, Illinois, EEUU.
2. Krause, T. R., Hidley, J. H., y Hodson, S. J. (1996). The behavior-based safety process: Managing involvement for an injury free culture (Segunda Edición). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
3. Austin, J., Kessler, M.L., Riccobono, J. E., y Bailey, J. S. (1996). Using feedback and reinforcement to improve the performance and safety of a roofing crew. Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 16 (2), 49-75.
4. Laitinen, H., & Ruohomaki, I. (1996). The effects of feedback and goal setting on safety performance at two construction sites. Safety Science, 24, 61-73.
5. Montero, R. (1995). Psicosociología applied to the accident prevention work. Business Studies, 88 (2), 64-68.
6. Montero, R (2003) Seven Principles of Behavior-Based Security. Prevention, Work and Health, 25, 4-11.
7. Ray, PS, and Bishop, PA (1997). Efficacy of the components of a behavioral safety program. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 19, 19-29.
Ricardo Montero Martinez, Professor and Consultant in Occupational Safety and Ergonomics. *
* Faculty of Engineering, Instituto Superior Politécnico "José A. Echevarria Havana, Cuba
